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basis of the funds being directed for the support of the children alone up-
on remarriage of the wife.22
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has resolved the question
under both types of provisions in favor of allowing the husband's deduc-
tion.23 The Tax Court has unequivocally chosen to follow the Lester
case where the agreement and decree reduced the amounts to both the
children and the wife as the contingencies would arise.24
On the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in accepting the history
of the statute and the intent of Congress as well as the unqualified lan-
guage used in a decision which was obviously intended to resolve the con-
flict between the courts of appeal, it is submitted that the courts will give
the decision broad application in the factual situations mentioned above.
FREDERICK MCKEAN LOMBARDI
ANNULMENT - DIVORCE - PRIOR LIVING SPOUSE
Abelt v. Abelt, 173 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio C.P. 1961)
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 173 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960)
In a marriage that is void because of a prior living spouse,' the decree
of nullity is merely a judicial declaration of the existing status, and may
be sought by either party.2 Even though such a decree is not a legal
necessity, it is in the interest of the parties as well as the public to obtain
it.' In the vast majority of states the equitable remedy of annulment is
the sole means for recognizing the standing of the bigamous marriage,
but in Ohio there is also the remedy of divorce - Ohio Revised Code
section 3105.01 (A).' A problematic issue in two recent decisions arises
from this dual approach to judicial recognition of the bigamous couple's
status.
In Abelt v. Abelt8 a minor husband petitioned for annulment of his
second ceremonial marriage, the first and still valid union having been
consummated in 1957. He alleged a pretended marriage of neither con-
summation nor co-habitation. He also alleged minority, duress, and the
22. There is a substantial difference between a mere reduction of payments upon the happen-
ing of certain contingencies and the affirmative direction that the funds be used for the sup-
port of the children upon the remarriage of the wife. When the money is directed to be
used only for the children, it is certainly "fixed" for their support within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code. Should the courts wait until the remarriage of the wife before allow-
ing the husband to be taxed on income used for support of his own children?
23. In Hirshon's Estate v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957), payments were
directed to the support of the child upon the remarriage of the wife. See also Weil v. Commis-
sioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958 (1957).
24. Lindley S. Bettison, P-H 1961 TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC (30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 5
61168 (June 9, 1961); Robert E. Dolan, P-H 1961 TAX CT. REP. & MrM. DEC. (30 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem.) 5 61165 (June 7, 1961).
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existence of a still-valid prior marriage.7 His second wife filed for di-
vorce, apparently unaware of her husband's petition.' Judge Jackson,
utilizing the memorandum opinion, set the trial date for both the wife's
divorce case and the husband's annulment case, the latter on the ground
of duress, and not on that of a prior living spouse. Following Eggleston
v. Eggleston,9 Judge Jackson concluded that divorce is the exclusive
remedy for the plural marriage situation."
In Schwartz v. Schwartz," a husband and his first wife staged an act
of adultery in order to procure a divorce in New York. Because of this
fraud in procurement, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that there was no
need to extend full faith and credit to that New York decree, and there-
fore the husband and his second wife, being unable to contract marriage,
were parties to a void bigamous marriage.12  After recognizing the pos-
sibility of divorce, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the com-
mon pleas court granting the parties' prayer for an annulment.
The basis for confusion in Ohio, regarding the existence of annul-
1. Nyhuis v. Pierce, 114 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); Short v. Short, 102 N.E.2d,
719 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951); Williams v. Williams, 90 Ohio App. 369, 106 N.E.2d
655 (1951); Blaustein v. Blaustein, 77 Ohio App. 281, 66 N.E.2d 156 (1946); Smith v.
Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943). The second marriage, after the dissolu-
tion of the first union, can be forged into a valid common-law marriage. See, e.g., Ryan v.
Ryan, 84 Ohio App. 139, 86 N.E.2d 44 (1948).
2. Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943). See also Waymire v. Jet-
more, 22 Ohio St. 271 (1872); Note, 4 WEST. REs. L. REV. 73 (1952).
3. "Social order and public decency demand that the parties to a meretricious relation, in
which the forms of marriage, apparently legal, seem to bind them, should be judicially re-
lieved therefrom." Because considerations of inheritance and succession of property often
depend upon the parties' marital status, and because witnesses and evidence tending
to establish the status many times disappear or lose persuasiveness through the passage of
time, it follows that the judicial declaration of nullity is in the interests of the parties. Way-
mire v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271, 274 (1872).
4. Only twelve states provide for bigamy as a ground for divorce. KEEzER, MARRIGE AND
DIVORCE §§ 330-31 (2d. ed. 1946); see 3 NFLsON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT, 55 31.14-
.17 (2d ed. 1945).
Many of the states that provide divorce for the bigamous marriage situation also by statute
provide annulment as an additional remedy. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. §§ 55-106-108 (1959);
DL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1551(3) (1953); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (1955).
Colorado has recently eliminated bigamy as a ground for divorce and has added it to the
grounds for annulment, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-1-1, 46-3-2, 3 (Supp. 1960). Other
states, handling the prior living spouse situation by means of divorce statutes, may also provide
common law annulment as an additional form of relief.
5. "The Court of Comon Pleas may grant divorces for the following causes: (A) Either
party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage from which the divorce is
sought."
6. 173 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
7. Id. at 908.
8. Ibid.
9. 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
10. Abelt v. Abelt, 173 NE.2d 907, 913 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
11. 173 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
12. Id. at 395.
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ment in the area of the plural marriage, is the case of Eggleston v. Eggles-
ton.'" There the bigamous second marriage, occurring as a result of im-
proper service in the divorce proceedings of the husband's first marriage,
lasted for about twenty years, resulting in two children and property
rights.' 4 The trial court's decision, affirmed in the court of appeals,
granted annulment, and as a result held that alimony was not available
to the second wife. 5 The Supreme Court of Ohio, considering the chil-
dren, the property rights, and the length of the second marriage, reversed
the lower court's decision, which had left the later spouse without ali-
mony, and held that divorce was the exclusive remedy in "that situa-
tion.""6 Instead of limiting this phraseology to that unique factual situa-
tion, some courts, including the one in Abelt, suggested an interpretation
that divorce is the exclusive remedy in all plural marriage situations."
The factual peculiarities temper the effect of Eggleston, and the holding
that divorce is the exclusive remedy in "that situation" should be con-
strued in the light in which it was rendered.
Several cases decided after Eggleston limit a broad interpretation of
its holding.'" The court of appeals in Nyhuis v. Pierce,'" faced with a
valid common-law marriage followed by a ceremonial union of almost
immediate separation, non-consummation, and non-cohabitation, held
that ". . . where the facts do not require the use of the divorce statutes
to protect rights of property or support, they should not be construed as
13. 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
14. Id. at 423, 103 N.E.2d at 396-97.
15. Neither party has the right to receive alimony in an annulment proceeding. Eggleston v.
Eggleston, 156 Ohio St. 422, 428, 103 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1952); Short v. Short, 102
N.E.2d 719 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951). However, the supreme court in the Eggleston
case also held that alimony was proper in a divorce based on the ground of the still valid
marriage. Id. at 428, 103 N.E.2d at 398. The supreme court relied on the cases of Smith v.
Smith, 5 Ohio St. 32 (1855), and Vanvalley v. Vanvalley, 19 Ohio St. 588 (1869), as
authority for this proposition. But it should be noted that the opinion in Vanvalley was made
on a motion for leave to file a petition in error. This motion was overruled. The case
therefore never reached the court on its merits, and is not authority for an allowance of ali-
mony under avoid contract of marriage. See also Basile v. Basile, 86 Ohio App. 535, 93 N.E.2d
564 (1948). In addition, statements relating to alimony in the Smith case were pure dicta.
For a further discussion of the problem of alimony in annulment and divorce actions, see
In re Duncan, 172 N.E.2d 483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Kontner v. Kontner, 103
Ohio App. 360, 139 N.E.2d 366 (1956); Treadway v. Treadway, 97 Ohio App. 248, 125
N.E.2d 552 (1954). Contra, Williams v. Williams, 90 Ohio App. 369, 106 N.E.2d 655
(1951); Basile v. Basile, 86 Ohio App. 535, 93 N.E.2d 564 (1948). On the subject of
alimony, see generally Gage v. Gage, 165 Ohio St. 462, 136 N.E.2d 56 (1956); Annot., 54
A.L.R.2d 1410 (1957).
16. 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395, 396 (1952).
17. Abelt v. Abelt, 173 N.E.2d 907, 913 (Ohio C.P. 1961); In re Duncan, 172 N.E.2d 478,
483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
18. It is true that there are no supreme court cases actually modifying or limiting Eggleston,
but since a decision of the court of appeals is binding on the lower courts in the county in
which it sits, Nyhuis v. Pierce, 114 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952), being decided in
Cuyahoga County, limits, in effect, the holding in Eggleston, at least for the court in Abelt.
19. 114 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
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being therein involved.""0 Even though neither party sought a divorce,
it appears that on the basis of Nyhuis, divorce is not the exclusive remedy
:or the plural marriage situation. The recent decision of Schwartz v.
Schwartz21 illustrates that the Nyhuis case still limits the broad statements
in Eggleston. The facts in Schwartz are similar to those in Eggleston, for
both involved a second union of some twenty years, with property rights
and children. But, after recognizing the possibility of divorce in the case
before it, the appellate court upheld the annulment decree, because
neither party asked for divorce.22 It held that such relief was both logical
and in accordance with the law. It appears then that where the parties
agree as to the relief sought, divorce or annulment, their wishes usually
-will be granted.
The case in which the parties differ concerning the desired relief is
-troublesome to the Ohio courts. Where, as in Eggleston, there is a sec-
-ond marriage of long duration, with children and property rights, divorce
is necessary and proper, for it provides alimony and protects property
rights. But which mode of relief should be applied in the Abelt situa-
-don, where the second marriage was of short duration, non-consumma-
-don, and non-cohabitation? The court has set the trial date for both
-the annulment case and the divorce case. However, the annulment case
is scheduled to be decided on duress and not on the ground of the prior
living spouse.23 In this regard the court has overlooked the following
issues: (1) whether divorce is the exclusive remedy under the doctrine
in Eggleston, and (2) if not exclusive, whether divorce or annulment is
-warranted under the facts of this case.
It has already been shown that divorce is not the exclusive remedy in
the plural marriage situation, the opinion in Abelt notwithstanding. Al-
though divorce may be the exclusive remedy in a situation such as in
Eggleston,2  a marriage of long duration, children, and property rights,
it is suggested that it is not controlling in Abelt, where the parties to the
extremely short childless marriage acquired no property rights to be di-
vided. Even though divorce has been granted upon cross-petition to an-
nulment actions, it is submitted that in order to arrive at the proper
remedy for the Abelt situation, the court should consider the results stem-
ming from each form of relief and balance the equities presented by
the facts.
PAUL Y. SHAPIRO
20. Id. at 80.
21. 173 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
22. Id. at 394-96.
23. Abelt v. Abel, 173 N.E.2d 907, 913 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
24. Another view is that Eggleston provided divorce as the exclusive remedy where one
of the parties petitioned for statutory relief under the divorce statute, OHIO REV. CODE
§ 3105.01 (A). It is submitted that the better view is to limit the Eggleston case to its facts,
and prescribe annulment where rights of property and support are not involved.
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